Alles erscheint so einfach, alle erforderlichen Kenntnisse erscheinen so flach, alle Kombinationen so unbedeutend, daß in Vergleichung damit uns die einfachste Aufgabe der höheren Mathematik mit einer gewissen wissenschaftlichen Würde imponiert. 
Introduction
Fairness has several interpretations in sports, one basic principle being that equally skilled competitors should have the same chance to win. While this is clearly not the only important axiom to evaluate sports rules -it is satisfied even if the outcome of a match is decided by a coin toss -, equal treatment of equals can hardly be debated. In particular, we address the problem of penalty shootouts in soccer (association football) from this point of view.
According to the current rulebook of soccer, Laws of the Game 2019/20, "when competition rules require a winning team after a drawn match or home-and-away tie, the only permitted procedures to determine the winning team are: a) away goals rule; b) two equal periods of extra time not exceeding 15 minutes each; c) kicks from the penalty mark" (IFAB, 2019, Section 10) . In the ultimate case, a coin is tossed to decide the goal at which the kicks will be taken. Then the referee tosses a coin again, the winner decides whether to take the first or second kick, and five kicks are taken alternately by both teams (if, before both teams have taken five kicks, one has scored more goals than the other could score, even if it were to complete its five kicks, no more kicks are taken). If the scores are still level after five rounds, the kicks continue in the sudden death stage until one team scores a goal more than the other from the same number of kicks. Following (Brams and Ismail, 2018) , we will refer to this rule as the Standard ( ) Rule. Since most penalties are successful in soccer, the player taking the second kick is usually under greater mental pressure, especially from the third or fourth penalties onward, when a miss probably means the loss of the match. Consequently, the team kicking first in a penalty shootout is recognized to win significantly more frequently than 50 percent of the time (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010; Palacios-Huerta, 2014; Da Silva et al., 2018; Rudi et al., 2019) .
Therefore, we consider three alternative mechanisms for penalty shootouts:
• Alternating ( ) Rule: the order of the first two penalties ( ) is the mirror image of the next two ( ), and this sequence is continued even in the possible sudden death stage of penalty shootouts (the sixth round of penalties is started by team , the seventh by team , and so on).
• Catch-Up Rule (Brams and Ismail, 2018) : the order of the penalties in a given round (including the sudden death) is the mirror image of the previous round except if the first team failed and the second scored in the previous round when the order of the teams remains unchanged.
• Adjusted Catch-Up Rule: the first five rounds of penalties, started by team , are kicked according to the Catch-Up Rule, but team is the first kicker in the sudden death (sixth round) such that the first mover is alternated in this stage.
Note that the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule combines the other two: it coincides with the Catch-Up Rule in the first five rounds and with the Alternating ( ) Rule in the sudden death stage. The three designs will be compared with respect to their fairness and complexity.
The original contribution of our paper resides in three points: (1) we find that the Catch-Up Rule, promoted by Brams and Ismail (2018) , does not outperform the simpler and already tried Alternating ( ) Rule under the assumptions of the same authors, which substantially reduces the importance of a central result of Brams and Ismail (2018) ; (2) we show that the proposed Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is fairer than both alternative penalty shootout designs; (3) we suggest the first general complexity measure of penalty shootout designs in the literature.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the problem of penalty shootouts, while Section 3 provides a quantification of the complexity of different mechanisms. The fairness of the penalty shootout designs is analyzed in Section 4, and Section 5 offers some concluding thoughts.
An overview of penalty shootouts
Soccer is typically a game with a low number of scores, therefore ties, even the result of 0-0, are relatively common. Since in knockout (elimination) tournaments only one team advances to the next round, these ties should be broken.
Before 1970, soccer matches that were tied after extra time were either decided by a coin toss or replayed. However, events in the 1968 European football championship led FIFA, the international governing body of association football, to try penalty shootouts (Anbarcı et al., 2018) .
2 In the following decades, penalty shootout has become the standard tie-breaking procedure in knockout tournaments.
In addition, penalty shootout may be a special tie-breaking rule in round-robin tournaments. For example, in the group stage of the 2020 UEFA European Football Championship, if two teams, which have the same number of points and the same number of goals scored and conceded, play their last group match against each other and are still equal at the end of that match, their final rankings are determined by kicks from the penalty mark, provided that no other teams within the group have the same number of points on completion of all group matches (UEFA, 2018, Paragraph 20.02) .
3
In the 1988-89 season of the Argentinian League, all drawn matches went to penalties without extra time such that winner of the shootout obtained two points, and the loser one point (Palacios-Huerta, 2014, Section 10). A similar rule was applied in the 1994-95 Australian National Soccer League, except that a regular win was awarded by four points (Kendall and Lenten, 2017 , Section 3.9.7).
On the fairness of penalty shootouts
The rules of penalty shootouts have inspired researchers to investigate the issue of fairness as it offers a kind of natural experiment: before June 2003, the team that won the random coin toss had to take the first kick, and after July 2003, the winner of the coin toss can choose the order of kicking. Stakeholders also feel potential problems, more than 90% of coaches and players asked in a survey want to go first, mainly because they attempt to put psychological pressure on the other team (Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta, 2010) .
The tied semifinal (after extra time) between Italy and the Soviet Union was decided by a coin toss for Italy. The final between Italy and Yugoslavia ended in a draw of 1-1 even after 30 minutes extra time, so it was replayed two days later.
3 Despite the restrictive conditions, it remains not only a theoretical possibility: in the elite round of 2016 UEFA European Under-17 Championship qualification, Poland overtook Ireland in Group 7, and Belgium was ranked higher than Spain in Group 8 due to this particular rule. 4 An interesting exception was a quarterfinal of the 2018 FIFA World Cup when the Croatian team captain Luka Modrić has chosen to kick the second penalties despite winning the coin toss against Russia (Mirror, 2018) .
Denote the two teams by and , assume that is the first kicker. Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) find that team wins with the probability 60.5% on the basis of 129 pre-2003 penalty shootouts and with the probability of 59.2% on the basis of 269 shootouts that include post-2003 cases. The advantage of the first kicker is statistically significant. However, using a superset of their pre-2003 sample with 540 shootouts, Kocher et al. (2012) report this value to be only 53.3% and far from significant. Palacios-Huerta (2014) further expands the database to 1001 penalty shootouts played before 2012 to get a 60.6% winning probability for the first team. Vandebroek et al. (2018) explain this disagreement with insufficient sample sizes as even a relatively small but meaningful lagging-behind effect (the team having less score than the other scores a penalty with only a 70% probability instead of 75%) cannot be reliably identified if only 500 penalty shootouts are considered.
Da Silva et al. (2018) gather 232 penalty shootout situations and get a 59.48% winning probability for team , which is statistically significant. On the other hand, Arrondel et al. (2019) find no advantage on the basis of 252 French penalty shootouts. However, their results show that the probability of scoring is negatively affected by the stake (the impact of my scoring on the expected probability that my team will eventually win) and the difficulty of the situation (the ex-ante probability of my team eventually losing). Finally, Rudi et al. (2019) investigate 1635 penalty shootouts, which leads to a statistically significant 54.86% winning probability for team . Although this value is closer in magnitude to the result reported by Kocher et al. (2012) than to the findings of Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) and Palacios-Huerta (2014) , the larger sample size enables a more precise estimation and higher statistical power to detect the (possible) advantage.
Similar problems may arise in other sports (Anbarcı et al., 2018) . Cohen-Zada et al. (2018) and Da Silva et al. (2018) show that the pattern does not favor the player who serves first in a tennis tiebreak. According to González-Díaz and Palacios-Huerta (2016), the player drawing the white pieces in the odd games of a multi-stage chess contest has about 60% chance to win the match. Therefore, since the World Chess Championship 2006, the colors are reversed halfway through in the match containing twelve scheduled games: one player plays with the white pieces in the 1st, 3rd, 5th, 8th, 10th, 12th games according to the | sequence. To summarize, while the empirical evidence is somewhat controversial, it seems probable that the team kicking the first penalty enjoys an advantage, which is widely regarded as unfair. This fact is also recognized by The IFAB (International Football Association Board), the rule making body of soccer: Laws of the Game 2017/18 explicitly says in its section discussing future plans that The IFAB will consult widely on a number of important Law-related topics, including "a potentially fairer system of taking kicks from the penalty mark" (IFAB, 2017). This mechanism was also applied in the 2017 FA Community Shield, where Arsenal, the winner of the 2017 FA Cup Final, won after an penalty shootout against Chelsea, the champions of the 2016/17 Premier League. There was even a controversy in the Dutch KNVB Cup in 2017 when a referee erroneously had employed the ABBA rule during a penalty shootout, so it should be replayed three weeks after (Mirror, 2017) .
However, the 133rd Annual Business Meeting (ABM) of The IFAB agreed that the Alternating ( ) rule will no longer be a future option for competitions due to "the absence of strong support, mainly because the procedure is complex" (FIFA, 2018) . Nevertheless, the reform process is far from dead as, for example, penalty shootouts are kicked according to the Alternating ( ) design in the 2018/19 season of Dutch KNVB Cup (KNVB, 2018) .
Academic researchers have proposed some further rules in order to increase fairness (Anbarcı et al., 2015 (Anbarcı et al., , 2018 Brams and Ismail, 2018; Echenique, 2017; Palacios-Huerta, 2012) . Our point of departure is the Catch-Up Rule (Brams and Ismail, 2018) , which takes into account the results of penalties in the preceding round to give an opportunity for the team performing worse to catch up. Assume that team kicks first, so it is advantaged in a particular round. In the next round, team will kick first except if fails and succeeds.
We suggest a slight but significant improvement of this mechanism. Note that the penalty shootout is essentially composed of two parts: the first five rounds, and the possible sudden death stage. Therefore, it makes sense to balance the advantage of the first mover by making it disadvantaged at the beginning of the sudden death. Formally, if team kicks first in the first round, then team will kick first in the sixth round (provided that it is reached). Under the original Catch-Up Rule, it is possible that kicks first in the sixth round, for instance, when it leads by 4-3 after four rounds, but fails and succeeds in the fifth round of penalty kicks. This variant of the Catch-Up Rule, which a priori fixes the team that starts the sudden death, is called the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule. Table 1 illustrates how the four rules work. The Red team is the first kicker, means a successful, and indicates an unsuccessful penalty. Since the result after five rounds is 3-3, the sudden death stage starts, where the Red team kicks first in the sixth round according to the Catch-Up Rule as the Blue team was the first mover in the previous round, but the Blue team kicks first in the sixth round when the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is used because it was disadvantaged in the first round.
The complexity of penalty shootout designs
The IFAB has decided against the Alternating ( ) Rule because of its complexity, so this should be another important feature of penalty shootout mechanisms. The first attempt to quantify complexity has been provided by Rudi et al. (2019) , however, the authors choose complexity levels somewhat arbitrarily and their method is not able to measure the complexity of stochastic rules, which depend on the outcome of previous penalties. Therefore, we give a procedure that can classify any penalty shootout design into different levels according to their complexity. Definition 1. Complexity: Suppose that the referee asks a mechanism designer who should kick the first penalty in the next round. Naturally, the referee knows the whole history of the shootout including the number of the next round. The mechanism designer has initially no information but she has the opportunity to ask the referee binary questions in order to determine who will be the first mover in the next round. The complexity of any penalty shootout mechanism is the average number of (clever) questions needed to solve the problem of the referee, taking into account that the questions and their number might depend on the answers to the preceding questions.
Definition 1 can be applied to reveal the complexity of a penalty shootout rule.
Proposition 1. The complexities of our penalty shootout designs are as follows:
• Standard ( ) Rule: 0;
• Alternating ( ) Rule: 1;
• Catch-Up Rule: 2;
• Adjusted Catch-Up Rule: 2.5.
Proof. According to the Standard ( ) Rule, team will be the first mover in the next round of penalties, which is known without any question. The Alternating ( ) Rule requires the knowledge of the parity (odd: team , even: team ) of the round. The Catch-Up Rule can be implemented with two questions because it depends on the first kicker in the previous round and on the fact whether the first kicker has failed but the second has scored in the previous round or not.
The Adjusted Catch-Up Rule first requires the knowledge of whether the sudden death stage is reached or not. After that, either the Alternating ( ) Rule (one question) or the Catch-Up Rule (two questions) is applied.
This approach seems to give reasonable values of complexity. For example, the design consisting of three rounds of followed by Catch-Up is 2.5: first, the mechanism designer should know whether the next round is one of the first three or not, and then the appropriate design can be implemented with further one ( ) or two (Catch-Up) questions.
Changing the rules only at the beginning of the sudden death stage can be considered less costly because the rule of aggregation changes at this point anyway. Consequently, applying instead of Catch-Up from the sudden death, that is, the Adjusted CatchUp Rule, is probably simpler than Catch-Up followed by from the third or seventh round. Hence, it makes sense to judge the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule only marginally more complex than the Catch-Up Rule.
The comparison of penalty shootout designs
In the following, three mechanisms presented before will be analyzed with respect to fairness and other issues. We adopt the notion of fairness from Brams and Ismail (2018) .
Definition 2. Fairness:
A penalty shootout mechanism is fair if the probability of winning the match conditional on winning the coin toss (ex-post) equals to the probability of winning the match before the coin toss (ex-ante).
In particular, in the case of identical teams, the ex-ante and ex-post winning probabilities should be 0.5. Hence a mechanism is called fairer than another if the probability of winning the match conditional on winning the coin toss is closer to 0.5 for equally skilled teams.
The standard rule will be not discussed here because it has already been investigated -and has been found to be considerably unfair -in Brams and Ismail (2018) . Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010, p. 2558) provide empirical probabilities with which a team scores a penalty on each round. These values are presented in Table 2 . It can be seen that the team kicking first in a given round always scores with a higher probability. Hence, following Brams and Ismail (2018) , we use the reasonable assumption that the probability of a successful kick depends only on whether the team kicks first or second in a round: the advantaged team has a probability of scoring, and the disadvantaged team has a probability (≤ ) of scoring. Similarly to Brams and Ismail (2018) , our baseline choice is = 3/4 and = 2/3, which are close to the empirical success rates given in Table 2 (especially in the last three rounds), and provide about 60% chance of winning for the first kicker as observed in practice by Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) and Palacios-Huerta (2014) .
Fairness: a simple model which solely depends on the order
To illustrate the model, Brams and Ismail (2018) analyze the Catch-Up Rule for a penalty shootout over two rounds and derive that = 3/4 and = 2/3 result in:
• the probability of team winning is 2 ( ) = 41/144 ≈ 0.285;
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• the probability of team winning is 2 ( ) = 39/144 ≈ 0.270;
• the probability of a tie is 2 ( ) = 64/144 ≈ 0.444.
If there is a tie after two rounds, the shootout goes to sudden death. Assume that team kicks first and let ( ) be the probability of winning for team in the sudden death stage. The Catch-Up, Adjusted Catch-Up, and Alternating ( ) Rules coincide in sudden death, the calculations of Brams and Ismail (2018) remain valid, that is,
For = 3/4 and = 2/3, we get ( ) = 10/19 ≈ 0.526. If the penalty shootout is played over two rounds before sudden death, the probability of a tie is 2 ( ) = 64/144. Under the Catch-Up Rule, kicks first in the third round with a probability of 58/144 ≈ 0.403, while kicks first in the third round with a probability of 6/144 ≈ 0.042, because team will kick first only in the case of the following sequence: fails, scores, scores, fails, which has a probability of (1 − ) (1 − ). Consequently, the probability that team wins is On the other hand, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule guarantees the first penalty in the sudden death for team , hence the probability that team wins under this mechanism is
We provide a more detailed discussion of the Alternating ( ) Rule because it is missing from Brams and Ismail (2018) , and it can contribute to a better understanding of the model. There are three ways for team to win a penalty shootout over two rounds:
scores on both rounds while fails to score on both On the first round, succeeds and fails with probability (1 − ). On the second round, kicks first and fails, while kicks second and succeeds with probability (1 − ) . The joint probability of this outcome over both rounds is
(1 − )(1 − ) .
II) 2-1:
scores on both rounds while fails to score on one of these rounds There are two subcases:
• scores on the first round On this round, both teams succeed with probability . On the second round, kicks first and fails, while kicks second and scores with probability (1 − ) . The joint probability over both rounds is (1 − ) .
• scores on the second round On the first round, succeeds and fails with probability (1 − ). On the second round, kicks first and succeeds, after which also scores, with probability . The joint probability over both rounds is (1 − ) .
Hence the probability of the outcome 2-1 is
III) 1-0:
scores on one round while fails to score on both rounds There are two subcases:
• scores on the first round On this round, succeeds and fails with probability (1 − ). On the second round, both teams fail with probability (1 − )(1 − ). The joint probability over both rounds is (1 − )(1 − )(1 − ).
• scores on the second round On the first round, both teams fail with probability (1 − )(1 − ). On the second round, kicks first and fails, after which succeeds, with probability (1 − ) . The joint probability over both rounds is (1 − )(1 − )(1 − ) .
Thus the probability of the outcome 1-0 is
Using the assumption = 3/4 and = 2/3, we get that:
• the probability of a tie is 2 ( ) = 62/144 ≈ 0.431.
It is not surprising that this rule leads to equal winning probabilities for the teams over two rounds. The Alternating ( ) Rule provides the first penalty in the sudden death for team because it is the third round, so the probability that team wins is
To summarize, while all three alternative designs tend to equalize the winning probabilities compared to the Standard ( ) Rule, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule seems to be the closest to fairness: the Catch-Up and Alternating ( ) Rules give 100 × The winning probabilities of the advantaged team -which kicks the first penaltyare shown in Table 3 for penalty shootouts lasting eight or fewer predetermined rounds followed by sudden death when = 3/4 and = 2/3. Note that the probabilities for the Catch-Up Rule have already been reported in Brams and Ismail (2018) up to five rounds.
All three methods, especially the Alternating ( ) Rule, exhibit a small odd-even effect since their bias is greater for an odd number of predetermined rounds. As expected, they make the contest fairer if the number of rounds increases. The simplest Alternating ( ) Rule is better than the Catch-Up Rule for an even number of rounds, while the latter has a marginal advantage for an odd number of rounds.
However, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule consistently outperforms both. The smallest imbalance can be observed for a penalty shootout played over four rounds, followed by sudden death if the shootout is still unresolved. In this case, the team kicking first has only 0.58% more chance to win under the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule.
Until now, we have investigated only the case of = 3/4 and = 2/3. Figure 1 plots the winning probabilities of team using the presented rules for different values of as a function of , where 0.5 ≤ ≤ since the penalties are usually successful. It shows that the order of these designs with respect to fairness is not influenced by the particular values chosen: the Catch-Up and the Alternating ( ) Rules remain almost indistinguishable, and the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule turns out to be the best as before. It can also be seen that all mechanisms are fairer if is closer to , according to our intuition.
Unfortunately, there is no hope to analytically derive conditions for and which make the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule fairer than the other designs even in this simple mathematical model. The reason is that the five rounds of penalties mean 2 10 = 1024 different cases, and the probability of each is given by a formula containing the product of ten items from the set of , , (1 − ), and (1 − ). Nevertheless, Figure 1 supports this conjecture by reinforcing the lack of non-linear effects.
Fairness: empirical round dependent scoring probabilities
Now the three rules will be compared in the view of the empirical round dependent probabilities from Table 2 . Since success rates in the sudden death stage are uncertain due to the small sample size, it is assumed that our former mathematical model holds Figure 2 presents the results of these calculations. While the Catch-Up Rule is closer to fairness on the basis of the empirical data than the Alternating ( ) Rule, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule remains the winner. We have attempted to determine the scoring probabilities and (≤ ) in the sudden death stage which make the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule fairer than the other two mechanisms. Formally, suppose that the following values are known:
• 5 ( ): the probability that wins a penalty shootout over five rounds without sudden death under the Catch-Up Rule;
• 5 ( ): the probability that a penalty shootout over five rounds is tied under the Catch-Up Rule, and kicks the sixth penalty according to the Catch-Up Rule;
• 5 ( ): the probability that a penalty shootout over five rounds is tied under the Catch-Up Rule, and kicks the sixth penalty according to the Catch-Up Rule.
Furthermore, denote by the probability of winning the sudden death by the team that kicks first in this stage. Formula (1) implies 0.5 ≤ because of the assumption ≤ in order to incorporate the psychological effect. Then the overall probability of winning for team under the Catch-Up Rule is
while the overall probability of winning for team under the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is
The Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is fairer than the Catch-Up Rule if the value obtained from (3) is closer to 0.5 than the value obtained from (2). By using the round dependent empirical scoring probabilities of Table 2 , this results in 0.5 ≤ ≤ ( ) ≈ 0.6569. Thus the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule becomes fairer than the Catch-Up Rule if
An analogous calculation leads to the conclusion that the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is fairer than the Rule if 0.5 ≤ ≤ ( ) ≈ 0.6252. The values ( ; ), ≤ for the scoring probabilities in sudden death that make the Adjusted Cacth-Up Rule fairer than the other two penalty shootout designs with the empirical results of Table 2 are plotted in Figure 3 . Our suggestion outperforms the Catch-Up Rule in the region indicated by the blue vertical lines, while it is preferred to the Alternating ( ) Rule in the region indicated by the green horizontal lines (the latter is a subset of the former). Since any reasonable value of is between these bounds, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule is the closest to fairness among the three designs even with the empirical round dependent success rates of Apesteguia and Palacios-Huerta (2010) . 
Beyond fairness: expected length, strategy-proofness, and complexity
In our model, the expected length of the sudden death stage is governed by the values of and , it is 1/( + − 2 ), the same for all mechanisms (Brams and Ismail, 2018) . The Catch-Up and Adjusted Catch-Up Rules differ only in which team kicks the first penalty of the sudden death. However, the probability of reaching this stage is greater with the (Adjusted) Catch-Up Rule than with the Alternating ( ) Rule as Figure 4 illustrates on the basis of some particular values of and as well as the empirical round dependent success rates given in Table 2 . Consequently, the former mechanisms can make the penalty shootout somewhat more exciting.
It has been presented recently that certain sports rules do not satisfy incentive compatibility, that is, a team might be strictly better off by exerting a lower effort (Csató, 2018 (Csató, , 2019 Dagaev and Sonin, 2018; Kendall and Lenten, 2017; Vong, 2017) . The Alternating ( ) Rule is not vulnerable to any kind of strategic manipulation since neither team can influence the order of shooting. According to Brams and Ismail (2018) , no team is interested in missing a kick under the Catch-Up Rule if ( − ) ≤ 1/2, which seems likely to be met in practice. The Adjusted Catch-Up Rule offers fewer opportunities to change the order of kicking the penalties since the first mover in sudden death is fixed, therefore it also satisfies strategy-proofness if the condition ( − ) ≤ 1/2 holds.
The complexity of these designs has already been revealed in Section 3. The application of a more complex mechanism is clearly questionable unless it yields meaningful gains in fairness and other aspects. The Catch-Up Rule seems to be not fairer than the Alternating ( ) Rule on the basis of Table 3 and Figure 1 , which reduces the significance of Brams and Ismail (2018)'s proposal. On the other hand, our Adjusted Catch-Up Rule dominates both of them except for a marginal increase in complexity.
Conclusions
Tournament organizers supposedly aim to guarantee fairness. However, the standard penalty shootout mechanism in soccer contains a well-known bias in favor of the first shooter, which remains a problem because an order of actions that provides an ex-post advantage to one team may harm efficiency by decreasing the probability of the stronger team to win. Consequently, there is little excuse to continue the use of the current rule.
We have demonstrated by a mathematical model that the recently suggested Catch-Up Rule is not worth implementing since it is not fairer than the less complex Alternating ( ) Rule already tried. On the other hand, the Adjusted Catch-Up Rule seems to be a promising candidate if penalty shootouts should be made as fair as possible and even more exciting. Finally, our quantification of complexity permits a two-dimensional evaluation of any other mechanisms proposed in the future.
